Tobacco Industry Interference Under Scrutiny as COP11 Opens in Geneva

 

By Samuel Mbewe

As governments gather this week for the Eleventh Conference of the Parties (COP11) to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), concerns over escalating tobacco industry interference are taking center stage, with new data and civil society voices warning that public health negotiations face unprecedented political pressure.

In Zambia, The Tobacco Free Association of Zambia (TOFAZA) has expressed strong concerns over the government’s choice of delegates representing the country at the 11th Conference of the Parties (COP11) to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).

TOFAZA Executive Director Brenda Chitindi said the appointments “misrepresented the country’s health priorities,” warning that Zambia risks losing critical global health funding if it fails to demonstrate commitment to its treaty obligations.

“This failure could jeopardize the health and wellbeing of millions of citizens,” Ms. Chitindi said.

Her remarks come amid growing criticism from health advocates who fear Zambia’s position at COP11 may undermine global efforts to curb tobacco use and strengthen public health protections.

Representing Zambia at the conference, Mbula defended the country’s stance, arguing that tobacco remains an economic lifeline for many rural households and continues to make a substantial contribution to national revenue. 

He called for “balanced policies” that reconcile public health objectives with the socio-economic realities faced by developing nations.

Mbula further reiterated Zambia’s commitment to an inclusive approach to treaty implementation and supported the re-establishment of the working group for Parties, emphasizing that countries should focus on completing and strengthening existing obligations before introducing new measures.

He cautioned that abrupt policy changes could disrupt livelihoods, especially in countries where thousands depend on tobacco farming and associated industries.

Despite the explanation, many civil society organisations advocating for stronger tobacco control were left stunned by Zambia’s position, arguing that it falls short of the decisive action required to protect public health.

Ahead of the conference, the WHO FCTC Secretariat issued one of its strongest warnings to date: tobacco industry actors are increasingly attempting to influence the treaty process. 

These tactics include lobbying national delegations, promoting misleading economic and scientific claims, and inserting industry-aligned voices into policy discussions efforts explicitly designed to weaken control measures.

Against this backdrop, the 2025 Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index—published by STOP and the Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control (GGTC) arrives as a timely diagnostic of the political environment COP11 negotiators must navigate.

Now covering 100 countries, its broadest scope yet, the Index measures how governments are implementing Article 5.3, which obligates Parties to protect public health policymaking from commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry.

“The main finding of the 2025 global tobacco index is that the tobacco industry has become more aggressive, more blatant, and continues exploiting policy loopholes,” said Mary Assunta, GGTC’s Head of Global Research and Advocacy.

Unveiled on the eve of COP11, the report underscores what is at stake as delegates debate new nicotine products, environmental protections, and potential endgame strategies.

This year’s Index shows rising and increasingly political interference across all regions.
Assunta noted that governments were often “enticed and frustrated” in their tobacco control efforts as the industry expanded its influence beyond health ministries and into investment, agriculture, finance, and trade portfolios areas where Article 5.3 is poorly understood or weakly implemented.

A key finding is the strategic targeting of lawmakers in 14 countries.
Some parliamentarians introduced industry-friendly amendments or slowed the passage of tobacco control laws after receiving external input. Several parliamentary committees reported sustained lobbying by industry-linked groups during reviews of nicotine product regulations.

Another pattern is the use of high-level, industry-sponsored “study visits” for political influence.
Members of Parliament, ministers, and governors accepted invitations to visit tobacco facilities including prominent trips to Philip Morris International’s research center in Lausanne, just an hour from where COP11 is taking place. These visits, framed as educational, often serve as informal channels of influence.

The Index emphasizes that resistance to interference hinges more on political will than economic resources.
Among the strongest performers this year Botswana, Palau, Finland, and Ethiopia economic and regional diversity is wide, illustrating that effective protection from industry influence is a matter of political leadership.

“Political will to protect public health is not dependent on income or location,” Assunta stressed.

The report also highlights the industry’s increasing use of crises and corporate social responsibility (CSR) to secure political goodwill.

Brazilian advocate Mariana Pinho described how tobacco companies leveraged catastrophic floods in Rio Grande do Sul to rebuild visibility and political access an example of what civil society calls “disaster opportunism.”

As COP11 begins, governments face an industry no longer relying solely on backdoor lobbying. Interference now includes disaster philanthropy, environmental messaging, cultural integration, and legislative influence factors that shape national positions long before negotiations start.

The central question in Geneva is whether Parties can uphold the core purpose of Article 5.3: shielding health policy from commercial interests.

The outcome of COP11 will influence not only the next phase of global tobacco control but also the credibility of the FCTC itself.

In an era where exceptions to Article 5.3 have quietly become normalized, political will remains both the treaty’s most fragile and most decisive safeguard.